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Growth is Good for Whom, When, How? 
Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction in Exceptional Cases  
 
John A. Donaldson1, Assistant Professor Political Science 
Singapore Management University 
 
“It should come as no surprise that the general relationship between growth of income of the poor and growth of 
mean income is one-to-one.” (Dollar & Kraay, 2000, p. 28) 
 
“Faster growth is normally better for the poor than slower growth, and is not systematically offset by any change 
in distribution. But huge exceptions – and the possibility of clusters of countries where growth is much better for 
distribution, or much worse – mean that these findings are the beginning, not the end, of the inquiry. Residuals 
matter.” (Eastwood & Lipton, 2001, p. 16)  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Economic growth often helps the poor, but what about the numerous cases when it does not? 
The widely-held belief that economic growth generally reduces poverty, encapsulated by two World 
Bank economists in the above-quoted article entitled “Growth is Good for the Poor,” leaves many 
cases unexplained. In their article – one of the most influential to advocate this argument – Dollar 
and Kraay analyze hundreds of cases (countries over periods of at least five year time periods), 
concluding that economic growth and poverty reduction are related on a one-to-one basis (Dollar & 
Kraay, 2002, p. 196). In addition, macroeconomic policies associated with liberalization, such as 
reducing inflation, moderating the size of the government, respecting the rule of law, opening the 
economy to trade and establishing a sound financial system, are good for both generating economic 
growth and reducing poverty (p. 218). Many scholars have criticized Dollar and Kraay’s research on 
methodological and theoretical grounds (e.g., Danielson, 2001; Eastwood & Lipton, 2000; Ravallion, 
2001; Rodrik, 2000). The present article adopts a different tact, taking seriously Eastwood and 
Lipton’s criticism (quoted above) that the original work ignores cases that are exceptions to the 
economic growth-poverty reduction relations – in short, that “residuals matter.” As Dollar and 
Kraay recognize on numerous occasions in their article, even a one-to-one relationship represents an 
average – a generalization with numerous exceptions. We can learn much from studying such 
exceptions. 
This research paper applies Dollar and Kraay’s data to examine two types of exceptions to this 
generalization. The first are “positive exceptions,” cases during specific time periods in which the 
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poor did much better than the model’s prediction based on economic growth rates. The second 
type, “negative exceptions,” includes cases in which the income of the poor increased significantly 
less than was expected. Examining these positive and negative exceptions is useful for illuminating 
pathways other than growth (or the absence of it) for poverty reduction (or the lack of it). Perhaps 
the positive exceptions can discern policy approaches other than economic growth that are effective 
for reducing poverty, providing hope and alternatives to the myriad economies in which economic 
growth has either been elusive or too slow in reducing poverty. Negative exceptions, likewise, may 
teach us approaches to avoid. In either case, this analysis moves beyond simple reliance on 
economic growth and looks for potential systematic factors that might explain the exceptions. 
Although “on average” economic growth can be expected to help reduce poverty, as World Bank 
economist Martin Ravallion argues, “people are often hurting behind the averages. Panel data and 
observations from the ground can reveal this, but the aggregate statistics cannot. It is important to 
know the aggregate balance of gains and losses, but it will be of little consolation to those suffering 
to be told that poverty is falling on average,” (Ravallion, 2001, p. 1811).2 
In this way, this paper neither contradicts nor confirms the general relationship between 
economic growth and poverty reduction. It argues instead that there are multiple pathways to 
poverty reduction, of which Dollar and Kraay identify but one – economic growth generated 
through liberal economic policies. 3 As some have argued (e.g., George & Bennett, 2005; Goertz, 
2005), relying on aggregate statistics is not the best way to identify the numerous diverse paths to a 
result, such as the multiple way that countries have successfully, and unsuccessfully, addressed poverty. 
Instead, careful qualitative research can be more effective in identifying alternative, contingent 
pathways. Else Øyen’s argument, nearly a decade old, applies equally today, “Up-to-date data are 
necessary to ensure that the poor and the intensity of poverty are kept visible to the public eye, but it 
may still be wise to put somewhat less energy into sheer measurement research, and instead turn to 
issues that yield more in poverty understanding” (Øyen, 1996, p. 10). 
 
2. IDENTIFYING EXCEPTIONS 
Defining the poor as the lowest quintile in terms of income, Dollar and Kraay compile a dataset 
from four different standard sources to produce 953 observations from 137 different countries or 
territories between 1950 and 1999. To render the sample more evenly distributed across countries, 
Dollar and Kraay choose dates from each country that are spaced five years apart, starting with the 
first year available, resulting in 418 country-year observations of mean income of the poor. The 
authors further filter the sample to 258 observations from 92 countries with at least two 
observations, also spaced five years apart.4 Dollar and Kraay, performing an ordinary-least-squares 
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37 
regression analysis of economic growth against poverty reduction, find an R2 of 0.49 and a 
regression line with a slope of 1.19. In spite of these results, the authors realize (notwithstanding 
their uncompromising title) that they cannot claim that poverty rates vary lockstep with changes in 
the economy, cautioning, “Our findings do not imply that growth is all that is needed to improve the 
lives of the poor. Rather, we simply emphasize that growth on average does benefit the poor as 
much as anyone else in society, and so standard growth-enhancing policies should be at the center of 
any effective poverty reduction strategy,” (Dollar & Kraay, 2002, p. 219). While Dollar and Kraay 
attempt to adjust to the difficulties in comparing surveys across counties, such as differing coverage, 
measures and units between observations, critics argue that this dataset has numerous additional 
methodological problems. Nevertheless, I adopt the same dataset because it provides a common 
basis from which to identify and learn from exceptions to the relationship between economic 
growth and poverty reduction.  
Although measurement errors and other data problems can be exacerbated when shifting from 
aggregate data to individual cases, closer scrutiny is also an effective way to identify such errors. For 
instance, such analysis revealed at least two cases among the 27 cases that apparently contain serious 
data errors. The first is Nepal. While Dollar and Kraay’s dataset reports that Nepal experienced a 
slight negative annual growth rate (-0.15%) between 1977 and 1984, the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators report positive economic growth across a variety of measures of GDP. 
Moreover, outlying villages in Nepal – among the poorest in the country – that were inaccessible by 
navigable road were probably not counted in the survey, and thus the data reflecting poverty 
reduction may be inaccurate. Second, the data for Yemen is even more suspect. Given the civil war, 
conflict with Eritrea, and extremely low literacy rates, it is unlikely – and little evidence can be found 
– that the income of the poor increased 8 percent per annum, as Dollar and Kraay’s data suggest.  
Overall, Dollar and Kraay’s sample contains much more variation than an R2 of 0.49 implies. 
For instance, more than one in six of the authors’ 285 historical cases violate the expectation that 
positive income growth improves the income of the poor (in 45 cases, incomes of the poor declined 
while GDP increased) or that negative income growth will reduce incomes of the poor (in six cases 
the income of the poor increase despite negative GDP growth). Indeed, a number of data points lie 
far enough away from the regression line that the income of the poor is statistically unlikely to be 
explained by economic growth alone. Instead of looking at the dataset in aggregate, this article uses 
the exceptional cases to identify alternatives to economic growth for poverty reduction.  
---- TABLE 1 HERE ---- 
Exceptions are determined by computing residuals, the vertical distance between the regression 
line and each data point, and calculating the probability that the distance is due to random variation. 
The further away any given point is from the regression line, the less likely it is that the model 
explains that point. For each data point, when the probability that changes in GDP explain changes 
in the income of the poor drops below five percent in either direction (equivalent to a 90 percent 
confidence interval), I label that point an “exception.” This process generates two types of 
exceptions (listed in Table 1): a) cases in which the increase in the income of the poor significantly 
outpaces expectations based on economic growth (“positive exceptions,” – positive from the point 
of view of poverty reduction), and b) cases in which the increase in the income of the poor was 
much less than the expectations based on economic growth (“negative exceptions”). Specifically, I 
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as well as my attempt to analyze why some cases were exceptions. 
37 
subtract the change in poverty rates predicted by the model (column 4 in Table 1 below) from the 
value reported by the data (column 5) and record this “residual” value in column 6. Column 7 
(labeled “outlier”) records the probability that the position of each case’s corresponding value for 
income of the lowest quintile is caused by random variation. This is estimated by calculating the “P” 
values of the residual’s “Z” scores to determine the chance that the point’s distance from the 
regression line is caused by random factors. For instance, as seen in Table 1, Finland during the 
period between 1962 and 1971 saw an annual growth rate of 3.99 percent, according to Dollar and 
Kraay’s data. Although the model predicts that the income of the poorest quintile should have 
increased 4.05 percent, the actual increase over this period, according to the data, was 14.6 percent, a 
difference of 10.56 percentage points. Since the likelihood that this data point can be explained by 
random error is approximately 0.38 percent, Finland is considered a positive exception. By contrast, 
China’s economy between 1990 and 1995 grew at an annual pace of 8.7 percent. However, although 
the model predicts that the growth rate in the income of the bottom quintile would exceed 9.6 
percent, the income of that group grew annually by only 0.87 percent. The chance that this data 
point is explained by random error is approximately 1.3 percent, meaning China during that time 
period qualifies as a negative exception. 
These exceptions are not trivial. In the 13 positive exceptions, the income of approximately 
33.5 million poor people grew faster than the model’s predicted rate by an average of 9.1 percentage 
points, while around 341 million poor people (101 million, excluding the case of China) in the 14 
negative exceptions saw their incomes rise by an average of 8.5 percentage points less than the 
model predicted.5 Moreover, these cases point towards alternative paths to poverty reduction, 
recipes that do not include growth, at least not as a prime ingredient. This paper examines the 
possibility that in these exceptional cases, specific political, social or economic factors explained the 
particular pattern of economic growth and poverty reduction experienced in the country. A 
complete analysis of each of the cases is an ambitious project, requiring greater time, space and 
specific area knowledge than is afforded here. Nevertheless, an initial examination reveals that these 
exceptional cases represent a range of approaches to poverty reduction and economic growth. None 
of these paths is new in that scholars have identified and analyzed many of them long ago. 
Nevertheless, because they re-emerge using Dollar and Kraay’s own data, they underscore that there 
are viable alternatives to Dollar and Kraay’s conclusions about the importance and centrality of 
economic growth and the need for implementing a set of liberal policies to reduce poverty. 
 
3. EXCEPTIONAL CASES 
Three of the positive exceptions are Scandinavian social democracies with broad-based social 
programs designed to minimize poverty rates (Gustafsson & Pedersen, 2000). Both Norway and 
Finland’s policies are characterized by large-scale government transfers, decommodification, 
unemployment programs and other extensive social programs (Kenworthy, 1999). While Norway’s 
economy grew relatively slowly between 1979 and 1984 (2.8 percent each year) and again between 
1989 and 1995 (per capita GDP declined 0.2 percent on average each year), the income of the 
poorest quintile grew rapidly, increasing 14.6 percent and 9.6 percent on average each year over 
those periods, respectively. The per capita GDP of Finland grew on average nearly four percent each 
year between 1962 and 1971, while the income of the bottom quintile increased 14.6 percent on 
average each year over that period. For Finland, this was a period of rapid poverty reduction, with 
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the number of Finns with income below the minimum national pension declining from 20 percent 
in 1966 to less than six percent in 1971, a result that the authors of one major study argue is 
explained by the establishment of a welfare state, “clearly the major, if not the only reason for the 
declined poverty rates in Finland,” (Gustafsson & Uusitalo, 1990, p. 256, 261). That Finland was a 
positive exception only in this period, and not in others, probably reflects increasing unemployment 
rates in the 1970s (from 1.9 percent in 1974 to 7.3 percent in 1978) and life-cycle changes which 
slowed gains for the poor (Gustafsson & Uusitalo, 1990). Neither of these countries directly relied 
on economic growth, and both implemented policies that conflict with liberal economic policies, 
with the welfare state creating conditions for rapid gains for those with lowest incomes while the 
economy as a whole grew more modestly. The extensive welfare provisions and cradle-to-grave 
coverage, as well as the large and progressive tax rates needed to support this system likely came at 
the expense of growth rates, an exchange the country was apparently willing to accept. 
Even as these social democracies maintained broadly targeted programs to ensure the 
distribution of wealth throughout these societies, one positive exception reduced poverty through 
newly established, targeted social safety nets and complementary social programs. During the oft-
derided presidency of Giscard d’Estaing, the growth in income of France’s poorest quintile outpaced 
economic growth to such an extent that the country qualifies as a positive exception. During this 
period Giscard, arguing that France would “never be at ease with herself until all the old inequalities 
had been removed,” established no fewer than seven benefit programs targeting and protecting the 
poor. Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas solidified France’s welfare state by pursuing a “new society,” 
including vocational training, welfare for the poor and elderly, and minimum wage increases. 
Meanwhile, oil shocks and skyrocketing raw material prices, combined with the collapse of the 
Fordist system of manufacturing slowed the economy (Levy, 1999). As a result, the income of the 
bottom quintile increased by an average of nine percent each year, in spite of the country’s 
moribund overall economic performance of 2.2 percent each year between 1977 and 1982. 
Conservative leadership strengthened the welfare state, helping to increase the incomes of the 
poorest quintile, shielding them from factors that slowed the growth of the overall economy. 
A number of positive exceptions from the developing world achieved poverty reduction 
through aggressive land reform and other distributive policies. Colombia (1964-1970) is one case in 
which a large-scale program of land reform, implemented during the presidency of Carlos Lleras 
Restrepo (1966-1970), helped increase significantly the income of the poor. Between 1968-69 alone, 
some 60,000 land titles involving 2.5 million hectares were issued to peasants and unemployed 
workers, a move that was vital to empowering the poor (Findlay, 1972).6 In addition, Restrepo’s 
policies helped curb inflation, diversified the economy away from the waning coffee market and 
improved the country’s balance of payments. Dollar and Kraay’s raw data supports this view, 
reporting that the Gini index for income in Colombia declined from 0.62 to 0.52 between 1964 and 
                                                 
6 The evidence related to the effects of land reform on poverty in Colombia is mixed. Some analysts, 
noting that the Gini coefficient for land holdings declined only modestly from 0.87 to 0.84 between 
the 1960s and 1990 (Deininger, 1999), argue that land reform failed to make land holdings more 
equitable, in part because most of these new land titles were taken not from large farms but from 
public land (Dorner & Felstehausen, 1970). However, the date range of these analyses may be too 
broad: land reform was rolled back in the early 1970s. Subsequent research shows that the increase 
in the concentration of land holdings, as Deininger (2004) subsequently noted, occurred after this 
rollback, primarily between the mid-1980s and 1990s. For instance, the share of land controlled by 
larger farms increased from 46 percent to 54 percent between 1984 and 1997. 
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1970 (although the Gini index rose again from 0.51 to 0.57 between 1991 and 1995 once land 
reform was reversed). Thus, during a period in Colombia, which included several years of land 
reform (1964-1970), this and other pro-poor policies seem to be primary causes behind the income 
growth of the poor, which averaged 17 percent each year. However, stimulating the rural economy 
rarely helps spur rapid economic growth, which came in at a modest 2.3 percent per year over the 
period. 7  
Redistributive policies are also responsible for the exceptional income growth of the poorest 
quintile in some of the other exceptional Latin American cases. For instance, the term of Peru’s 
President Juan Velasco Alvarado was characterized by nationalization of the petroleum and other 
industries, as well as compulsory land reform policies and broader education policies (Lopez & 
Valdes, 2000; McClintock, 1981). Although Peru’s economy stagnated between 1971 and 1981, 
growing less than one percent on average as foreign debt mounted, the income of the poor in Peru 
increased by more than eight percent per year over that time as peasants benefited from land reform 
and other redistributive policies. Moreover, the low growth was likely directly linked to the 
government’s poverty reduction policies, suggesting poverty reduction came to some extent at the 
expense of economic growth. Between 1972 and 1985, inequality declined sharply with the share of 
the total income of the poorest 60 percent increasing from 18 to 27 percent, according to one survey 
(Glewwe, 1988). Similarly, the income of the poorest quintile of El Salvador (1989-1995) increased 
9.5 percent on average, despite a relatively modest annual average economic growth of nearly 2.6 
percent. The peace accords signed in January 1992 that ended the civil war in that country coincided 
with policies designed to address staggering inequality through land transfers, rural education, 
support for establishing microenterprises and housing assistance, broadened poverty alleviation 
programs and spending for social sectors, policies intended to reintegrate combatants into civilian 
life. These primarily benefited lower income growth by enhancing non-agricultural jobs, as well as 
improving education and opportunities for the poor (Boyce, 1995; Marques, 2004). These 
progressive redistributive programs, along with remittances from relatives overseas8 and a period of 
relative peace and stability, helped to make El Salvador a positive exception in which the poor 
received a disproportionate share of the benefits of economic growth. 
Similarly, Chile’s first post-Pinochet government era, led by the reform-minded, center-left 
government led by Patricio Aylwin, was marked by gradual reform, redistribution and relative 
empowerment of the poor, making the country a positive exception (1987-1992). The repressive 
Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1989), advised by the “Chicago Boys,” a group of University of Chicago 
trained economists inspired by Milton Freidman, was famously neoliberal (Hudson, 1994). Yet, the 
administration’s economic record was surprisingly mediocre, with per capita economic growth 
averaging a modest 1.9 percent each year from 1974-1989, and regressive, leaving 44.4 percent of all 
Chileans under the poverty line in 1987 (Ritter, 1992). Based on a credo of “growth with equity,” the 
subsequent Aylwin administration implemented an ambitious set of social programs. In the early 
1990s, Aylwin increased real health expenditures by an impressive 70 percent and expanded primary 
health care services in poor areas, both rural and urban. The government strengthened labor unions, 
                                                 
7 Urban-to-rural migration increased substantially, probably contributing to these rates of growth. 
However, the rate of increase in the urban population, which greatly outpaced expansion of urban 
jobs, limited the benefit of migration for the income of the poor (Dorner & Felstehausen, 1970). 
8 In 1989, remittances from relatives made up 3.5 percent of the country’s GDP. After the peace 
accord was signed, remittances increased rapidly, reaching US$686 million, or 8.1 percent of GDP, 
in 1992, and US$870 million, or 9.7 percent of GDP, in 1994 (Wood & Segovia, 1995). 
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vigorously oppressed by Pinochet, carefully compromising with business to protect workers without 
undermining the market economy. New programs providing job training and child care were also 
enacted, while pensions were made more equitable. All of this was paid for by increases in the value-
added tax. These policies were largely responsible for the striking decline in poverty from 5.2 million 
in 1990 to 800,000 in 1992, with a 50 percent decline in the poverty gap (Weyland, 1997). Further, 
Alwyin allowed a degree of decentralization, providing greater autonomy to the municipalities and 
provided them with independent funding. Programs such as those related to Chile’s Sectoral 
Regional Investment (ISAR), allowed regional governments to request the transfer of up to five 
percent of the investments of Chile’s sectoral ministries. Projects transferred under the ISAR 
mechanism included rural and urban roads and pavements, neighborhood schemes and potable 
water. Decentralizing these schemes led to a more equitable distribution of resources amongst the 
municipalities, and local governments’ better understanding of local conditions further benefited the 
poorest people in the country (Stewart & Ranis, 1994). Dollar and Kraay’s data is consistent with the 
research of others (e.g., Larranga 1994, Castro 1994, cited in Weyland) that economic growth cannot 
fully explain the strong employment growth and rise in wages (a predicted 5.14 percent increase in 
income of the lowest quintile compared to the 13.35 percent rise actually measured). Despite 
Aylwin’s reforms, the administration did not fundamentally alter the liberal market system, but 
promoted significant yet gradual change through effectively increasing spending for social programs 
and protections, and the poor benefited disproportionately from the relatively robust growth.  
Contrasting with this reform-minded government, one of the positive exceptions in Latin 
America implemented structural reforms, indicating that liberal prescriptions can be a path that 
helped cases become positive exceptions. Rodrigo Alberto Carazo Odio, Costa Rica’s conservative 
president between 1978 and 1982, faced an emerging debt crisis and rapidly increasing inflation 
rates. In response, he implemented IMF-prescribed reforms and policies to liberalize the economy, 
with mixed results. Between 1977 and 1982, Costa Rica’s economy shrank more than three percent 
each year on average, increasing unemployment. Despite the recession, the income of the poor 
gained 2.25 percent, far exceeding the predicted 4.72 percent loss, which rendered the country a 
positive exception during this period. 
Just as countries have traversed a variety of paths to become positive exceptions, so too have 
some countries become negative exceptions through a range of policies. The most common of these 
did so through rapid liberalization and reform. The “shock therapy” and privatization policies 
implemented by governments of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the wake of 
Communism’s collapse sharply contracted the economy, eliminating millions of jobs and destroying 
the already fraying social safety nets of the Soviet system. This affected the poor especially badly 
(Bunce, 1999). While the gross domestic products of Bulgaria (1989-1994), Estonia (1988-1993) and 
Ukraine (1988-1995) declined annually by an average of 4.9 percent, 8.4 percent and 11 percent, 
respectively, over this period, the income of the poor fell far more than expected, declining each 
year by an average of 16.3 percent, 18.4 percent and 20.2 percent, respectively. Russia’s experience 
(1989-1993) is especially dramatic. While the Russian economy contracted as per capita GDP 
declined 6.4 percent each year on average, the income of the poor declined 20.9 each year, as 
workers were retrenched, inefficient factories were closed, the agricultural sector weakened and 
economic protections were dismantled. These eastern European countries implemented sudden 
transitions from planned to market-based economies, including the removal of price supports, 
elimination of subsidies from state-owned enterprises, liberalization of foreign trade and slashing of 
government expenditures (Derleth, 2000), especially rapid versions of liberal reforms that Dollar and 
Kraay advocate. Lacking economic and political institutions, needed as regulators and facilitating 
37 
mechanisms in the absence of the state and considered to be essential for the capitalist economy to 
moderate the effects of these sudden shifts, the economy collapsed. GDP plummeted in these 
countries with the poor suffering more than others (World Bank, 2000).  
Because Poland is often cited as defying this trend, it is surprising to find it among the negative 
exceptions. When Poland liberalized after the fall of communism, new-found freedom to participate 
and invest in the economy sparked economic growth overall, making the country the only post-
socialist state to achieve a positive average GDP growth rate between 1990 and 1997 (Bunce, 1999) 
and the only European post-socialist economy to surpass its pre-transition GDP within six years of 
the transition (Derleth, 2000). However, like other Eastern European countries, shock therapy also 
aversely affected the lowest quintile. Rapid privatization caused mass layoffs of workers, increasing 
unemployment from nearly zero to more than 15 percent between 1989 to 1993, without the 
corresponding safety nets found in most Western European countries (Kramer, 1995). The poor’s 
income declined by an average of 2.7 percent each year between 1991 and 1996,9 less than in other 
shock therapy countries, but enough to raise misgivings on Poland’s status as a ‘model’ example of 
post-Communist reform (e.g., Sachs, 1995, p. 275), as far as poverty is concerned. In Poland’s case 
(unlike much of the rest of post-Communist Eastern Europe) liberalization spurred growth, but (like 
the region’s other reforming states), these impressive gains came at the expense of income growth 
among the poor.  
At least two other countries became negative exceptions because they scaled back or eliminated 
progressive social policies. Colombia, between 1970 and 1978, directly after the period in which the 
country was a positive exception, became a negative exception. During this period, in order to 
liberalize and allow the market to make distribution decisions, the government rolled back land 
reform and other progressive social policies that it had implemented during the previous period. In 
their place, the government implemented market-oriented policies, including opening the economy, 
providing incentives for foreign capital and eliminating barriers to free investment in the countryside 
(Molano, 2000). The government’s cancellation of land reform in 1971 and the subsequent 
introduction of new crop varieties during the green revolution exacerbated the already inequitable 
distribution of land (Findlay, 1972; Puyana, 2000). Ironically, though this is considered a time of 
economic recovery, with annual per capita GDP growth in Colombia increasing during this period 
by 3.3 percent on average, the income of the poor concurrently declined annually by an average of 
4.8 percent. Thus, while the cancellation of many of the pro-poor programs likely increased 
economic growth rates, compared to that of earlier periods, this growth came at the expense of 
policies intended to reduce poverty, and reduced the income of the poor. 
That China (1990-1995) is a negative exception is surprising, since it is often cited as a typical 
case in which economic growth directly contributed to poverty reduction (e.g., Zhang, Huang, & 
Rozelle, 2003). One key reason was the shift from reforming the rural economy to stimulating urban 
development. For instance, subsidized loans, originally intended to reduce rural poverty through 
subsidizing poor agricultural families’ investments in agricultural inputs and assets, were redirected 
during this period to promoting industry, retarding its effect on rural poverty reduction (Zhang et 
al., 2003). Despite rising overall GDP rates, this period saw a declining share of GDP for agriculture 
(especially between 1990 and 1993), which one recent World Bank study emphasizes is crucial for 
poverty reduction (Ravallion & Chen, 2007). Finally, between 1988 and 1995, education and health 
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poverty rates were higher in 1998 than they were in 1991 (World Bank, 2000).  
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care costs took an increasingly high proportion of rural incomes of the rural poor, an effect which 
countered much of the benefits of economic growth for the poor (Gustafsson & Li, 2004). 
According to Dollar and Kraay’s data, economic growth in China between 1990 and 1995 increased 
by an average of 8.7 percent, even as the income of the poor increased on average less than one 
percent each year, a rate that is consistent with Gustafsson and Li’s disaggregated income data (p. 
295). Thus, while the income of the poor continued to rise, it lagged far behind the growth in 
income in the rest of the population.  
Debt, inflation, widespread corruption and misguided policies were primary factors for Brazil’s 
becoming a negative exception. The country’s economic downturn of 1986-1993, a period of 
mounting debt and rampant corruption, were overseen by the Sarnay administration. The poor were 
also hurt by a punitive policy of price and wage control and a 1987 moratorium on foreign debt 
payments that isolated Brazil, weakening foreign credit and investment. In 1990, its first year in 
office, the succeeding Collor presidency implemented far-reaching economic reforms, including 
deepening price and wage freezes, confiscating savings and deindexing the economy. While this 
successfully curbed inflation, real incomes plummeted, especially for the poorest (Roett, 1999). 
Meanwhile a sagging agricultural sector affected large numbers of rural residents, particularly in 
northeastern Brazil. Abuses of the state hamstrung national development (per capita GDP declined 
about one percent each year over that period), and the poor, whose income declined 10.6 percent 
per year, faring far worse than the population as a whole.  
Chaos and violent disruption was the direct cause of at least one negative exception. The 
economic losses to the poor when death squads terrorized El Salvador compounded the general 
misery of this period. Much of the period of the “death squads,” which began with the right-wing 
military government seizing power in 1979 and ended with peace accords in 1992 (Boyce, 1995), 
overlaps with the 1977-89 period in which the income of the poor shrank 9.3 percent per year, 
compared to the annual decline in per capita GDP of 1.7 percent. (Subsequently, as described above, 
the country’s recovery qualified it as a positive exception.) The civil war ultimately claimed 70,000 
lives and destroyed much of the nation’s infrastructure. While the economy as a whole suffered 
greatly, the severe disruption in the education system and other social services further eroded the 
already precarious living conditions of the poor, disproportionately affecting poor people, who were 
affected more than other groups (Marques, 2004).  
Given the country’s relatively broad-based public housing and education programs intended in 
part to moderate poverty, Singapore’s status as a negative exception is also unexpected. 
Nevertheless, between 1978 and 1983, when per capita economic growth averaged 5.8 percent per 
year, the income of the lowest 20 percent declined 1.3 percent on average each year. During this 
period, the government transformed the economy to be more capital-intensive, encouraging the 
automation of processes previously done by non-skilled or semi-skilled physical labor (Chow, Lee, 
Hameed, & Cheong, 1988, p. 178; Peebles & Wilson, 1996, p. 37). Since public assistance for the 
poor in Singapore is highly restricted, families avoid poverty primarily through employment (Lee, 
2001). During this period, economic growth remained moderately strong as productivity increased, 
but those with insufficient human capital (the poor, disproportionately) to meet new demands from 
the service sector suffered job losses and lower incomes (Chow et al., 1988). Economic growth likely 
came at the expense of the poor.  
Focusing on exceptional cases can sometimes identify two comparable countries that are 
relatively similar in many aspects, but are on opposite ends of the spectrum. Examining these 
naturally controlled cases allows us to focus on contrasting policies and other factors that might 
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cause the differences. This sample contains two neighboring African countries, one a positive 
exception (Mauritania), the other a negative one (Mali). The increase in the income of the poor in 
Mauritania (9.7 percent on average between 1988 and 1993, despite growth of 1.7 percent) can be 
explained by several major factors. First and most important was a return to stability in the wake of 
three factors: a) recovery from repeated droughts in the 1980s, b) the cessation of the militarized 
conflict with Senegal and c) the end of the country’s isolation from western powers that began when 
Mauritania supported Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War. In the early 1990s, President Ould 
Taya introduced political and economic reforms, granted amnesty to former militants and political 
opponents, and held free elections. With his sweeping election victory, the president oversaw several 
years of relatively stable and effective government and various types of non-governmental 
organizations and other forms of civil society flourished (Pazzanita, 1997).10 Second, a large-scale 
mining sector – including recently established copper and gold industries – added jobs that low-
skilled poor people could perform (Coulombe & McKay, 1996). Third, IMF programs that were 
suspended during the war with Senegal but reinstated in 1992 also had the effect of reducing 
domestic demand through fiscal consolidation and a conservative monetary policy – effects which 
likely constrained GDP growth, but did not hurt as much the rural poor, who relied on subsistence 
farming and were insulated to a certain extent from the formal economy. While the stability of this 
period helped boost the economy as a whole, it likely favored the rural poor who suffered greatly 
through the war and drought. This factor, combined with new opportunities and programs for the 
poor, explains the reported disconnect between economic growth and poverty reduction.  
Mali, Mauritania’s neighbor, was also an exception between 1989 and 1994, but a negative one. 
Just before this period, in a misguided attempt to respond to a series of droughts, the government 
liberalized and restructured the agricultural sector, flooding the market with cheaper imports and 
destroying the market for domestic agricultural production. Under IMF loan conditions, Mali 
slashed government employment, sold state assets, increased taxes and enhanced control over 
import and export duties. The sudden and steep devaluation of the local currency paradoxically 
made it more difficult and expensive for urbanites – the poor especially – to purchase food 
(Toulmin, Leonard, Hilhorst, & Diarra, 2000). The resulting economic recession – per capita GDP 
declined 2.6 percent on average each year between 1989 and 1994 – was especially harsh on the 
country’s poor, whose income declined 11.4 percent annually over that period.  
 
4. ANALYSIS 
As Table 2 summarizes, there are multiple paths to reduce poverty and many ways to exacerbate 
it. Progressive redistribution policies explain at least three positive exceptions (Colombia, Peru and 
El Salvador). The government of one case (France 1975-1981) strengthened the nation’s social 
safety net through extensive state-sponsored welfare programs. Three cases are Scandinavian social 
democracies. Structural readjustment policies based on liberalization explain at least one positive 
exceptions (Costa Rica), while stability and increased opportunities for employment of the poor 
combine to create the final positive exception examined here (Mauritania). In each of these cases, 
policies were implemented that increased the incomes of the poorest quintile to a greater extent than 
predicted by overall growth. Similarly, negative exceptions traversed a variety of pathways. Two 
                                                 
10 This stability was short-lived, as President Ould Taya favored specific tribes and regions to a 
greater extent than other presidents of the country had, a fact that contributed greatly to subsequent 
dissatisfaction with the regime, and tribal-based corruption increased steadily over time. 
37 
(Colombia 1970-1978 and China 1990-1995) rolled back progressive policies. Violence and the 
destruction of civil war explain one negative exception (El Salvador), while corruption, debt and 
inflation explain yet another (Brazil 1986-1993). The implementation of structural adjustment 
policies was the most common path taken by negative exceptions. Two implemented structural 
adjustments of various types – Mali an IMF program and Singapore an internally-derived 
development strategy. Five eastern European cases implemented policies identified with “shock 
therapy,” that also involved wholesale structural adjustment. Each case saw the income of the 
poorest drop far more than would be expected by economic growth alone (only one case did the 
income of the poor actually grow at all). This list, generated from a limited sample, does not exhaust 
the range of possible strategies.  
---- TABLE 2 HERE ---- 
Many cases involve other factors that cut across those in Table 2. First, many cases support the 
finding that promotion of agriculture, especially in the developing context, can help the poor to a 
greater extent than economic growth alone (e.g., Dorward, Kydd, Morrison, & Urey, 2004; Mellor, 
1995). While traditional agriculture is often the main occupation of the poor, it is often of low scale 
and lacking in technology, and is thus not generally particularly productive. An expanding 
agricultural sector therefore can contribute to poverty reduction while not substantially promoting 
economic growth in the short term. This was seen in the positive exceptions which implemented 
land reform (e.g., Peru, Colombia 1964-1970 and Nepal), as well as in negative exceptions in which 
the agricultural sector slackened (e.g., Colombia 1970-1978, China and Mali).11 Thus, agriculture – 
for good (if it is promoted) or ill (if it slackens) – seems to be instrumental in explaining the results 
of a number of exceptional cases. Second, democratization is a mixed bag regarding its impact on 
poverty, as some have argued (e.g., Leftwich, 2005). While the positive exception of Chile (1987-
1992) is one case in which democratization encouraged pro-poor policies, other cases cast doubt on 
the positive role of democracy. For instance, the authoritarian leader of Peru was able to use the 
coercive power of the state to implement a sweeping program, including forced land reform and 
other programs that contributed to improving the incomes of the poor. Moreover, the wave of 
democratization that swept across Eastern Europe coincided with economic stagnation that 
disproportionately hurt the poor. On the other hand, this likely resulted more from the breakdown 
of government institutions brought about through rapid reform than it did from democratization 
per se.  
This research also supports the hypothesis that “inequality is bad for the poor” (as one 
advocate, Martin Ravallion (2005), puts it) and conversely that lower Gini coefficients correlate with 
pro-poor growth. Looking at the relationship between static inequality and poverty reduction on the 
extreme cases as a group, a mixed pattern emerges. Consistent with Ravallion’s hypothesis, eight of 
the 14 negative exceptions had Gini coefficients above 45, the Gini coefficient of all the negative 
                                                 
11 Nepal’s government over the period in question for the first time focused on reducing poverty by 
supporting agriculture. Starting in the Sixth five-year plan (1980-1985), Nepal spent liberally on 
promoting agriculture, placing emphasis on food production and developing cash crops, such as 
tobacco and sugar cane (Regmi, 1997). Moreover, foreign aid from Japan and Europe focused on 
the agriculture sector and improving irrigation, watershed management, primary education and 
raising livestock. While there is doubt about Nepal’s status as a positive exception (its low growth 
rate is likely underestimated, as discussed above), these programs likely helped significantly improve 
the income of the poor. 
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exceptions averaged 44.9 and not a single negative exception had a Gini coefficient lower than 30, 
Ravallion’s informal standard for low inequality (p. 11). Also consistent with Ravallion’s 
expectations, four of the 13 positive exceptions (Yemen, Norway 1989-1995, Finland and France) 
have Gini coefficients below 30 and two more (Nepal and Norway 1979-1984) have Gini 
coefficients under 31 (although Yemen and Nepal probably have serious measurement errors, as 
noted above). On the other hand, there are also six positive exceptions with Gini coefficients above 
45 (mainly Latin American counties, plus Mauritania), and the Gini coefficients of all the positive 
exceptions averaged above 38 – not especially impressive. However, Ravallion’s thesis would lead us 
to expect not only that low (high) Gini indices should induce a more (less) elastic relationship 
between economic growth and poverty, but also that a decreasing (increasing) inequality could 
explain positive (negative) exceptions.  
Observing the Gini index more dynamically reveals an even clearer pattern that is remarkably 
consistent with Ravallion’s expectations. Of the positive exceptions, all but two (El Salvador 1989-
1995 and Mauritania) show increasing Gini indices – and El Salvador’s Gini increased by less than a 
point over the entire period. Moreover, eight of the positive exceptions are among the ten cases 
which saw the greatest reduction of inequality. Moreover, every one of the negative exceptions 
showed worsening inequality; seven of these are among the top 10 cases for increases in the Gini 
index. The analysis of the specific cases underscores the role that low inequality plays in some of the 
positive exceptions, such as the social democratic Nordic countries, as well as France. High 
inequality is also related to some negative exceptions, including Brazil, an example that Ravallion 
(2005) cites in his article. Moreover, redistributive policies can address or partially override the 
negative effects of inequality, as occurred for instance in Colombia and Peru. Thus, changes in 
inequality clearly played a role in the pathways of many of these exceptional cases.  
What of Dollar and Kraay’s second argument (other than their contention that economic 
growth is good for the poor) that liberal policies – which they measure through low inflation, low 
government consumption, high openness to trade, depth of the financial system and establishment 
of rule of law – are best for achieving the growth that reduces poverty? While this article does not 
address the role of liberal policies for the cases nearer the regression line, the exceptional cases it 
does study (some 10 percent of Dollar and Kraay’s sample) provides little support for liberalization. 
Indeed, among the numerous cases in the sample that liberalized, only two (Costa Rica and 
Mauritania) were positive exceptions. While Costa Rica (1977-1982) implemented an IMF program 
involving liberalization, this positive exception provides only weak support because the country’s 
economy as a whole suffered badly over that five year period. Indeed, Costa Rica stands as one of 
the few countries, and one of three positive exceptions, in which the income of the poor increased 
(by two percent per year) even as incomes as a whole declined (3.4 percent per annum), and the 
Carazo government’s economic management as a whole was considered disastrous (e.g., Wilson, 
1999).12 While another positive exception, Mauritania, did implement IMF policies linked to 
liberalization, these policies contributed to the country being a positive exception in an unusual way. 
As argued above, these policies reduced aggregate demand, hampering economic growth, but did 
not much affect the poorest of the rural poor. The poor meanwhile were greatly helped by a more 
stable political environment and effective government and the mining sector that hired many from 
                                                 
12 This result contrasts with that of other studies, which indicate that poverty in Costa Rica increased 
between 1977 and 1983 from 16.1 percent to 30.5 percent (Rodriguez & Smith, 1994). This does not 
necessarily contradict Dollar and Kraay’s data since the poorest quintile’s income could increase 
even as poverty rate, which exceeds 20 percent, rises.  
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their ranks. Thus, overall stability and the opening of new opportunities that could be accessed by 
the poor were likely more important in understanding the growth of poor income. Meanwhile, 
several negative exceptions adopted policies consistent with the liberal agenda by implementing 
shock therapy programs (e.g., Post-Communist Eastern European cases), restructuring their 
economies (e.g., Mali, the Dominican Republic and Singapore) or shifting sharply away from 
progressive to more liberal policies (e.g., Colombia 1970-1978). Moreover, a number of positive 
exceptions implemented strategies in marked contrast to liberal policies, including sometimes radical 
redistribution (e.g., Colombia 1964-1970, Peru and El Salvador 1989-1995) and establishing social 
welfare programs of various types (e.g., France, Norway and Finland). Thus, these exceptional cases 
suggest that the effects of liberal policies on poverty and economic growth are at best contingent.  
Analyzing four of Dollar and Kraay’s indicators of liberalization (due to data limitations, the 
indicator for “rule of law” is constant for all countries) for changes between the dates also reveals 
mixed support for liberalization as a pathway explaining the exceptions.13 If changes in the degree of 
liberalism were to explain the differences in residuals between the positive and negative exceptions, 
we might expect a systematic difference between these two types of cases in terms of changes in the 
four indicators with which Dollar and Kraay measure liberalism, and that such changes are 
systematically related to the residuals. However, an ANOVA test indicates no significant difference 
between the two groups of cases for any of these indicators, and a regression analysis run on these 
four variables against the residuals reveals a “P” value of 0.932 for the entire sample. Thus, analyzed 
in aggregate, these indicators of liberalization do not seem to explain the exceptional cases.  
Focusing on cases more specifically, we might expect that percentage changes in the four 
indicators of the positive exceptions would rank highly compared to other cases. However, none of 
the positive cases rank even in the top quintile of all cases for each of the indicators. El Salvador 
(1989-1995) comes closest, ranking 38 of 231 for increasing trade openness, 5 of 248 for lowering 
government expenditure, 17 of 263 for lowering inflation and 66 of 232 for development of the 
financial sector. However, some of these changes (especially the first three) are likely to be caused by 
the end of the civil war and the normalization of relations with major trading partners more than 
policies of liberalization. Moreover, as argued above, since El Salvador’s government overtly 
redistributed wealth during this period, this case is not a typical example of a liberalizing country, 
although this fact is not captured by these indicators. The only other positive exception that 
approximates conforming to liberalization is Chile. However, while the country ranked 10 of 184 for 
reductions in government expenditures and 46 of 175 for trade openness, Chile did not rank even in 
the upper third for changes in the other two indicators during this period. Moreover, that Chile 
comes this close to representing a case of liberalization is ironic, given the praise Milton Friedman 
and other liberal economists lavished on Pinochet’s economic policies. Consistent with the analysis 
above, other positive exceptions, such as Honduras and Peru ranked near the bottom of 
liberalization. Ironically, all four indicators for Costa Rica, which implemented IMF liberalization 
policies, worsened, with the changes in indicators related to inflation and financial institutions 
ranked near the bottom. To be sure, there are negative exceptions that score badly on changes in 
liberalization – the authoritarian and closed governments of El Salvador (1977-1989) and Brazil are 
not surprising in this regard. However, while Poland ranks near the bottom for the other two 
indicators, lowered government spending and development of the financial industry, Poland’s 
                                                 
13 Unlike the case of inequality, where both the absolute value of the Gini index as well as changes in 
that index should influence the formation of exceptions, it makes more sense to study these four 
indicators dynamically, as such changes should represent the process of liberalization.  
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ranked 2 of 263 for increasing trade openness and 15 of 231 for lowered inflation, which is 
consistent with expert accounts that the country during this period typified liberalization. The 
negative exception of Dominican Republic, while ranking poorly for trade opening and lowered 
inflation, ranked 13 of 248 for reduction of government expenditures and 34 of 232 for its financial 
industry. Moreover, the negative exception of Singapore ranks at the very top for rule of law.  
Two conclusions can be drawn from this review. First, this analysis underscores the weakness 
of these five commonly-used proxies of liberalization. For instance, trade as a proportion of GDP 
can increase from liberalization, but it can also increase with circumvention of sanctions, as is 
occurring with increasing exports of raw materials between China and Africa, or with the end of 
major conflict, as appears to be the case for El Salvador. Rule of law can be high in countries that 
are otherwise illiberal – Singapore has high government consumption and a heavy reliance on state-
owned enterprise, but it ranks first for rule of law, for instance. Thus, one primary weakness is that 
the variables, which purport to reflect the expected results of liberalization, do not reflect well the 
degree of liberalization of actual policies implemented by a particular country. Supplementing these 
indicators, which emphasize the effects of policies, with an analysis of the policies that were actually 
implemented, is warranted. Otherwise, based solely on the indicators of liberalization, one might 
conclude that Post-Pinochet Chilean leaders actually liberalized, a conclusion with which Milton 
Friedman might have disagreed vehemently. Second, overall, there is little support for advocating 
liberal policies irrespective of the political, economic, or social context. The state was active in most 
positive exceptions (despite their differences), implementing new policies and social support 
program, strengthening institutions and even applying violence on the poor’s behalf. While some 
also implemented some aspects of a liberal framework (controlling inflation, for instance), few of the 
positive exceptions can truly be considered liberal economic systems. On the other hand, many cases 
involving states that were withdrawing from a role in the economic arena in a manner consistent 
with liberal approaches ended up being negative, not positive, exceptions. 
This brief survey is incomplete for a number of reasons. First, the database adopted for these 
exercises, though covering the experiences of an extensive range of countries over the past several 
decades, omits many countries, including the poorest, for which comparable quantitative data are 
difficult to obtain. While adopting Dollar and Kraay’s data allows direct comparison with their 
analysis, in doing so this study also adopts many of the data’s flaws. Moreover, limitations in space, 
time and expertise prevent the extensive exploration required to establish strong causal linkages 
between potential factors and the end result. Some exceptional cases were not analyzed, while the 
analysis for others was necessarily brief. Despite the need for additional work to trace causal 
connections between government policy and the economic effects, we can nevertheless suggest that 
in many cases, government strategies and policies shaped and influenced the degree of economic 
growth and poverty reduction, and the degree to which economic growth (or the lack thereof) 
influenced poverty rates.  
In addition, the factors that are identified in this paper demand further attention. For instance, 
while some of the positive exceptions are Scandinavian social democracies (Finland and Norway), 
identifying them as such is insufficient to explain these performances. Since many social 
democracies (e.g., Sweden and Denmark) and many time periods in Norway and Finland were not 
exceptional under this study’s strict criteria, further comparative research is needed to illuminate why 
some Scandinavian social democracies during certain periods were exceptional, while others were 
not. Similarly, some countries that restructured their economies achieved strikingly different results, 
with some (e.g., Costa Rica) becoming positive exceptions and others (e.g., Mali) becoming negative 
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ones. Identifying which factors, in combination with restructuring, led to these puzzling results 
requires a closer comparative review of the cases. Through qualitative methods, we can discover the 
complex array of factors, whether political, economic, social, geographic, demographic or otherwise, 
that interacted with such policies to produce these exceptional results.  
One additional issue that should be addressed is the short-term nature of these cases (usually a 
five year span) versus the sometimes long-term benefits of economic growth. Those holding this 
view might argue that, valid as this article’s conclusions might be in the short term, fewer exceptions 
might appear in the long term because the disjuncture between economic growth and poverty 
reduction narrows over time. Following the principles behind Kuznets’s inverted “U” (which 
predicts that, due to varied responses from different economic sectors under economic growth, 
income inequality will initially increase for a time as the economy grows, before subsequently 
declining), we might expect that negative exceptions will occur while growth is primarily benefiting 
the non-poor, until the gap closes over time as the benefits of growth spread, possibly even creating 
positive exceptions (Kuznets, 1955). While little empirical evidence supports Kuznets’s inverted “U” 
pattern (Kanbur, 2000), even without following that strict pattern, growth can eventually benefit the 
poor over the long-term. While this argument is plausible, many advocates of economic growth and 
liberal economic policies specifically reject “trickle-down” growth as an important mechanism for 
poverty reduction arguing that growth directly benefits the poor as much as other groups (e.g., 
Dollar and Kraay 2002, p. 219). Moreover, few of the cases discussed here fall into a pattern 
consistent with Kuznet’s expectations. Colombia, for one, became a negative exception after – not 
before – it was a positive exception. El Salvador does show an inverted “U” pattern, but this is 
explained by peace and redistribution, not by the dynamics that Kuznets predicts. In many countries, 
such as China which in the 1980s showed an upright “U” pattern, inequality continues to expand, 
despite decades of growth. While the image of a generation sacrificing for the benefit of their 
children is evocative, in many cases, a generation of poor people toil for national development (or 
the enrichment of a narrow class), the benefits of which are skewed away from the poor, whether of 
their generation or the next. While economic growth may someday trickle down to the poor, the 
vague promises of such future gains may be a cold comfort.  
Finally, what of the issue that some of these cases might be explained because poverty 
reduction policies came at the expense of economic growth? As discussed within some of the cases, 
this “trade-off” seems to apply to a number of positive exceptions, including the Scandinavian social 
democracies, as well as Peru, which implemented direct redistributive policies that alleviated poverty 
but reduced productivity and slowed the growth rate. There appears to be no trade-off in other 
cases, including that of Chile (which grew faster in the post-Pinochet era than it did before), Costa 
Rica (which did not implement major policies to help the poor that would conflict with growth) and 
possibly France (which faced a number of external pressures on growth, such as rising prices of oil 
and raw materials). Among some negative exceptions, economic growth sometimes came at the 
expense of the income of the poor. Singapore’s stimulation of higher-order manufacturing, which 
required more human capital than many poor people were endowed with, increased growth at the 
expense of the income of the poor. Poland, among the shock therapy countries, achieved positive 
economic growth that traded off with jobs held by the poor. Colombia’s cancellation of many pro-
poor policies increased its rate of growth compared to the previous period (when it was a positive 
exception), while the income of lowest quintile dropped precipitously. Many of these exceptions, 
therefore, do suggest that in some cases economic growth indeed comes at the expense of poverty 




This research project seeks to identify pathways to poverty reduction other than economic 
growth by focusing on exceptional cases. Many social scientists using regression and other types of 
quantitative methods often discard residual cases as random anomalies that, while inconvenient, do 
not detract significantly from, or contribute to, the overall conclusions. Granted, some exceptional 
cases will be explained by important but uninteresting (to social scientists at least) factors, such as 
weather or natural disasters, that are largely out of human hands. Data errors can create other 
apparent exceptions, such as the cases of Nepal and Yemen. Caution is warranted, in any case, when 
applying insights from such exceptions to other cases, as much damage has been caused by blindly 
applying models generated in certain spheres even when situations are dissimilar – advice that 
applies to policies derived from all ideologies. 
Despite these concerns, it remains possible that these unusual patterns are caused by social 
actors who did something within the political, social or economic realms to achieve exceptional 
results. This suggests a general approach that applies to more than the question of the relationship 
between economic growth and poverty reduction: through disaggregating aggregate statistical 
models, we can identify potentially puzzling cases. Studying such anomalies – explaining and 
understanding them – furthers theory, a key mission for social scientists. Studying exceptions opens 
up theoretical space, allowing us to seek other factors that contributed (in this case) to reducing 
poverty. What is more, analyzing such exceptions deepens our understanding of the connection 
between economic growth and poverty reduction and the conditions under which this connection 
applies. Within the variation in Dollar and Kraay’s data lie clues to alternative paths to effective 
poverty reduction – empirical models that policymakers seeking to reduce poverty can cautiously 
emulate, carefully adapt or consciously avoid. Studying such exceptional cases increases our 
knowledge about what (besides promoting economic growth) has worked or not worked for 
reducing poverty. As two economists argue:  
“… the general assertion that ‘growth is good for the poor’ is not the most interesting way 
to interpret this finding. What is interesting is to identify common features of positive 
(negative) residuals – cases where growth leads to substantially better (worse) poverty 
outcomes than predicted from global regressions. If these features can be linked to policies, 
there is a case for switching toward policies that connect the poor more to growth…” 
(Eastwood & Lipton, 2000, p. 40) 
This paper answers this call. Its conclusions do not undermine a basic conclusion that 
economic growth and poverty reduction are often related – to assert that they do falls into the trap 
of radical falsificationism in which one or some exceptions undermine otherwise generally applicable 
theoretical statements. Yet in numerous cases involving tens of millions of poor people, economic 
growth is divorced from poverty rates. For negative exceptions, heady economic growth helped the 
poor less than expected or recessions hurt the poor significantly more than it did others. For 
positive exceptions, the income of the poor increased despite negative growth or poverty rates 
declined greatly in spite of more modest economic growth.  
The pathways identified herein are not new, as scholars have cited many of these positive 
exceptions for their unexpected accomplishments in reducing poverty to a greater extent than 
economic growth alone could. Nevertheless, they reinforce the view that while a complete list of 
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viable pathways to poverty reduction should include economic growth (achieved through a number 
of ways) and liberal economic policies (which have reduced poverty through growth and 
independently of growth), numerous other strategies that have been used by countries to reduce 
poverty should also be included. It is true that none of these paths are ‘systematic’ mechanisms for 
poverty reduction in the sense that they do not apply “on average” across all cases. However the 
quest for systematic solutions to poverty comes dangerously close to a search for a panacea, part and 
parcel of the discredited attempt to confront complex and multifaceted social issues with a covering 
law. There is no miracle lever – not economic growth, not the market, not the state – to reduce 
poverty, for poverty reduction is contingent upon the type of development that has been achieved 
or policies implemented, and the impact of these on the livelihoods of the poor. Economic growth 
sometimes reduces poverty; sometimes, when poorly distributed, it leaves poverty untouched. Other 
times, when economic growth shifts market forces, capital and property rights against the interests 
of the poor, it can undermine the positions of the most vulnerable of society, exacerbating poverty. 
When economic growth does benefit the poor, often it is insufficient or takes a long time in coming. 
As Nobel Lauriat Amartya Sen’s argued nearly two decades ago (it is equally true today), “Not 
merely is it the case that economic growth is a means rather than an end, it is also the case that for 
some important ends it is not a very efficient means either… It might well be the case that ‘money 
answereth all things,’ but the answer certainly comes slowly” (Sen, 1983, p. 754). 
More than one billion people still live on less than one dollar a day, and annual poverty-related 
deaths exceed 18 million (Pogge, 2005). Given the contingent and sometimes long-delayed benefits 
of economic growth for the poor, and decades of fruitless search for a magic bullet, the imperative 
of discovering alternative pathways that work to reduce poverty remains urgent. 
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Table 1: Exceptional cases. Sources: Dollar and Kraay (2002); author’s calculations 
 
Country Time Period Annual Growth of 
GDP/Capita  
Predicted annual 
change in income 
of lowest quintile 
Reported annual 
change in income 




Cases in which reported annual change in income of lowest quintile exceeded model’s predictions 
Colombia 1964-1970 2.33% 2.08% 17.16% 15.08% 0.01% 
Norway 1979-1984 2.75% 2.58% 14.57% 11.99% 0.12% 
Finland 1962-1971 3.99% 4.05% 14.61% 10.56% 0.38% 
Nepal 1977-1984 -0.15% -0.86% 9.61% 10.47% 0.40% 
Honduras 1986-1991 -0.25% -0.97% 8.62% 9.60% 0.75% 
Yemen 1992-1998 0.28% -0.35% 8.00% 8.35% 1.70% 
Mauritania 1988-1993 1.72% 1.36% 9.65% 8.30% 1.76% 
Peru 1971-1981 0.91% 0.40% 8.51% 8.11% 1.98% 
Chile 1987-1992 5.14% 5.41% 13.35% 7.94% 2.20% 
Norway 1989-1995 2.67% 2.48% 10.26% 7.78% 2.41% 
El Salvador 1989-1995 2.59% 2.39% 9.51% 7.11% 3.54% 
France 1975-1981 2.19% 1.92% 9.01% 7.08% 3.59% 
Costa Rica 1977-1982 -3.41% -4.72% 2.25% 6.97% 3.83% 
Cases in which reported annual change in income of lowest quintile fell below model’s predictions 
Ukraine 1988-1995 -10.96% -13.66% -20.21% -6.55% 4.80% 
El Salvador 1977-1989 -1.74% -2.73% -9.31% -6.58% 4.73% 
France 1956-1962 3.84% 3.87% -3.07% -6.95% 3.87% 
Singapore 1978-1983 5.83% 6.23% -1.28% -7.51% 2.82% 
Mali 1989-1994 -2.62% -3.78% -11.39% -7.61% 2.67% 
Poland 1991-1996 4.83% 5.04% -2.73% -7.78% 2.42% 
Estonia 1988-1993 -8.40% -10.63% -18.41% -7.78% 2.41% 
Colombia 1970-1978 3.35% 3.29% -4.79% -8.08% 2.02% 
Dominican Rep 1984-1989 2.38% 2.15% -6.45% -8.59% 1.46% 
Brazil 1986-1993 -0.97% -1.83% -10.57% -8.75% 1.32% 
China 1990-1995 8.71% 9.64% 0.87% -8.77% 1.30% 
Bulgaria 1989-1994 -4.86% -6.43% -16.28% -9.85% 0.63% 
Puerto Rico 1963-1967 6.08% 6.53% -4.80% -11.33% 0.21% 
Russia 1988-1993 -6.43% -8.30% -20.88% -12.58% 0.07% 
  35
Table 2: Multiple Paths toward/away from Poverty Reduction 
 
Positive Exceptions 
1) Progressive Redistribution 
Colombia (1964-1970) 
El Salvador (1989-1995) 
Peru (1971-1981)  
Chile (1987-1992) 
2) Social Welfare Programs 
France (1975-1981)  
3) Social Democracy 
Finland (1962-1971) Norway (1989-1995) 
Norway (1979-1984)  
4) Liberal Policies/Structural Readjustment 
Costa Rica (1977-1982)  
5) Stability/Opportunities accessible by the poor  
Mauritania (1988-1993)  
 
Negative Exceptions 
1) Regressive Redistribution 
Colombia (1970-1978) China (1990-1995) 
2) Structural Adjustment 
Mali (1989-1994) Singapore (1978-1983) 
3) Violence/Chaos 
El Salvador (1977-1989) 
4) Corruption/Debt 
Brazil (1986-1993) 
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